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WHAT DO BUDDHISTS HOPE FOR FROM
ANTITHEISTIC ARGUMENT?
Paul J. Griffiths

This essay begins by distinguishing an argument's validity from its cogency,
and emphasizing the importance for understanding particular philosophers of
knowing how they saw both matters (I). It then gives an introduction to the
views of Mok:;;akaragupta, an Indian Buddhist philosopher, on both these
matters (II-III), and an analysis of his rebuttals of arguments for God's existence, and his arguments against the possibility of God's existence (IV). It concludes by showing that these arguments, though taken to be valid by
Mok:;;akaragupta, were not intended by him to be persuasive; it suggests, also,
that this is a typical feature of such arguments.

I The Persuasive Power of Argument
There is now a fairly substantial secondary literature on scholastic Indian
Buddhist argumentation about the existence and nature of isvara, of God. l
Most of it concentrates upon the formalities and technicalities of the arguments. These are of course extremely important and their careful exposition and critical analysis is still at its relatively early stages: perhaps it will
require another generation or two of work before exploration and use of
these arguments have become part of the ordinary practice of the philosophy of religion in the West. But there are other fundamental questions
about these arguments scarcely yet asked at all. One of these is: What persuasive power did those who developed and used these arguments take
them to have? What was hoped for from their use? This is a question about
what Indian Buddhists thought their arguments might achieve. Associated
with it is a further question: Were they right to think what they thought
about this? I'll address both these questions in what follows.
An argument's validity is not the same as its cogency; if an argument is
valid it need not be cogent, and if cogent it need not be valid. It will therefore generally be important in philosophical discussion to know how the
relation between the two is understood by participants. It is possible to
think that good philosophical arguments (valid ones with true premises)
have (or ought to have) a lot of cogency, a lot of persuasive power; if you
think this then you may think, as Robert Nozick puts it (though without
endorsing the view), that such arguments

... force you to a conclusion [because1if you believe the premisses you
have to or must believe the conclusion ... A philosophical argument is
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an attempt to get someone to believe something, whether he wants to
believe it or not ... philosophers need arguments so powerful they set
up reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses to accept the conclusion, he dics. 2
This is the knockdown argument. A valid argument of this sort (there
aren't any, of course) has maximal persuasive power. A valid argument
taken to have somewhat less persuasive power might be thought to convict
those presented with it and capable of understanding it of irrationality if
they don't accept its conclusions. Some might think that textbook illustrations of modus poncns are like this. A valid argument taken to have less
power still might be thought to make the acceptance of its conclusions
plausible (or possible, or some such), but not to make such acceptance necessary for the preservation of rationality. Perhaps arguments about ethical
questions are typically like this. And a valid argument taken to have relatively little persuasive power might be thought convincing or useful only
to those who already, and independently, accept its conclusions.
Arguments in macroeconomics might usefully be so understood, since
they seem to persuade no one of anything.
When someone offers you an argument, then, it's important to understand what persuasive power they take it to have. If you think they take it
to have maximal persuasive power and yet your brain doesn't explode
upon not accepting it, you're likely to think that the argument has failed.
But perhaps those who offer it to you take it to have much less power than
this, and take your rejection of it if you don't already (and independently)
take its conclusions to be true as entirely consonant with the argument's
success (and with its validity and the truth of its premises). Or perhaps you
judge an argument you're offered to have succeeded because it has made
its conclusions plausible or attractive to you; but then it turns out that its
propounders understand it to be much more persuasive than this, and take
it to have failed because you don't find yourself compelled on pain of irrationality to accept its conclusions as true.
These points suggest that philosophical understanding (and productive
philosophical engagement) require knowing not only what arguments
someone offers, but what understanding of argument is implicit in such
offerings. And it's just here that more questions need to be asked about
Indian Buddhist anti theistic argumentation. What p~rsuasive p0'Yer did
the scholastics (Vasubandhu, Bhavya, DharmakJ:rti, Santarak:;;ita, Santideva, Kamalaslla, JfJ.anasrl, RatnakIrti, to call only the more famous names on
the roll) who propounded such arguments take them to have? It's very
easy for late-twentieth-century western interpreters of the texts in which
these arguments are found to abstract them from their context (and most
often the context is a compendium intended principally for the training of
Buddhist monks who already and independently take the arguments' conclusions to be true, not one of argumentative engagement with opponents)
and assess them as though they were understood to have (and ought be
understood by us to have) a high degree of persuasive power on the model
of (say) Spinoza's demonstrationes in the Ethica. But perhaps the arguments
were not (or not always) so understood.
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In this paper I'll try to shed some preliminary light on the question of
what persuasive power Indian Buddhist scholastics took their antitheistic
arguments to have. This will involve saying something about what those
arguments were like, but providing exposition of that sort will remain secondary to exploration of the former question. I'll proceed by looking at one
work by a late Indian Buddhist thinker, Mok\O(s)akaragupta.

IT Mok?fikaragupta and the Tarkabhfi?ii
We know relatively little about Moki?akaragupta's life, but it is probable
that he lived in Bengal in the late eleventh or early twelfth century and that
he was a Buddhist monk learned not only ilL Buddhist philosophical literature but also in that of the nonbuddhist schools. This means that he lived
at the end of the period in which Indian Buddhists were composing
scholastic works in Sanskrit. After the beginning of the thirteenth century
the institutional context that had made such activity possible largely
ceased to exist in India (the monastery with which Moki?akaragupta was
connected was probably destroyed by Muslims in 1202).3
Moki?akaragupta's surviving work suggests that he was not a particularly original thinker, and (as with most Buddhist tlUnkers) that he would
have taken it as a compliment not to be so regarded. The central purpose
professed by most such thinkers was the handing on, without change or
damage, of a tradition of reasoning they had received from their teachers:
The work upon which I'll comment is called Tarkabhii?fi in Sanskrit, which
might be translated A Description of Logic, or (possibly) The Language of
Logic. 5 It is an introductory work, intended for monks beginning the study
of tarka, which term covers parts of what we call epistemology, parts of
what we call formal logic, and parts of what we (used to) call dialectics.
Mok::;akaragupta says of his own work that it is intended to elucidate
the thought of Dharmaklrti (a figure of numinous importance in the history of Buddhist theorizing about tarka; he predates Mok::;akaragupta by four
or five hundred years) for young students of small intelligence." It does not
presuppose any extensive or precise knowledge of the topics it treats, and
does not provide detailed treatment of controversial questions within those
topics. Instead, it introduces students to the main divisions of the subject
(tarka), to the technical terms deployed by those composing within its
bounds, and to the main positions taken. It is an introductory lexicon and
doxography, not too unlike the introductory textbooks used in our institutions of higher education. This makes it in many respects ideal for my purposes because it provides a conspectus of the basics of tarkl7 (of its categories and subdivisions, of the intellectual equipment needed to do further
work in it), and can reasonably be taken as giving what were then generally agreed to be the fundamentals of the discipline. Since (inevitably) much
of it is concerned to set out for the novice a useful taxonomy of the subject's topics, it provides material on the basis of which reasonable generalizations can be made about what persuasive power arguments in general
(and, in particular, arguments against God's existence) were taken to have.
The work has three major subdivisions. The first deals with the nature of
accurate awareness (samyagjiiiina) and the means or practices (pramfiI)a,
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which I shall render 'doxastic practice') by which we get it. The second division deals with arguments offered to oneself, for one's own benefit
(svarthanumana). Arguments treated under this head are intended to provide those who offer them with knowledge about objects or states of affairs
not directly perceived by the senses. The standard example is that you can
come to know by the construction of an argument that there is fire on a distant mountain even when you perceive only smoke because the mountain is
too distant for you to see or feel the fire. The fire of whose existence you
come to know is something not directly perceived by the senses. The third
division of the work deals with arguments made for the benefit of others
(pararthanumana). These arguments use words (are vocalized, or possibly
written), and are intended to convince others of things, to produce knowledge in others. That is, they have an argumentatively persuasive purpose, a
dialectical purpose. The material in both the second and third divisions of
the work treats matters of logical theory, and the theory is largely the same
in each case; the difference between them is only that the third division is
interested in persuasion while the second division is interested in the management of an individual's noetic structure. I shall not distinguish between
the divisions in what follows, though obviously questions about persuasive
power are of most significance for topics treated in the third division.
I'll now turn to a fairly lengthy exposition of what Moki?akaragupta
thinks about argument in general as a necessary prolegomenon to a discussion of what he thinks about its persuasive power.

III Mok$akaragupta 011 Argument
A valid argument, according to Moki?akaragupta, consists of only two elements. As he puts it: "For Buddhists, an expression that demonstrates something has only two members. They are called invariable concomitance and
presence in the subject."7 The two elements are: (1) all A-possessors have B; (2)
5 is an A-possessor. The paradigm is (1) All smoke[A]-possessors have fire [B];
(2) This mountain [5] possesses smoke. The conclusion, (3) (Hence) This
mountain [5] has fire [B], is left unexpressed, though it does state the knowledge that is gained through a proper argument for oneself ( svarthanumana;
this was, recall, the topic of the second division of Mo~akaragupta's work). In
this formalization, A (smoke) is what Moki?akaragupta calls the liriga, the
'mark', or the hetu, the 'reason' (other synonyms are sadhana, 'that which
proves', jiiapaka, 'that which makes known', vyapya, 'that which is to be pervaded'). This mark is typically an observable property, and in order for it to be
properly usable in an argument of this sort, it must have three characteristics.
First, pak$adharmata, 'presence in the subject'. This means that the
mark must be present in 5, that smoke must be present in the mountain.
Moki?akaragupta puts it thus:
Definite existence of [the mark] is ascertained in the locus to which
the argument is directed: [This means] that the definite presence of
the mark is ascertained in the property-possessor (the mountain is an
example) to which argument is directed. This is one [of the three
characteristics], and is called 'presence in the subject'.s
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Second, anvaya, 'positive concomitance'. This means that the mark is
present only in members of the class to which S belongs, things relevantly
like S (in this case, all fire-possessors):
Existence of [the mark] is ascertained only in what is like the subject.
The expression 'what is like the subject' means 'a thing of the same
kind'; it indicates those things that, like the subject, possess a property indicated in an example [e.g., 'as in a kitchen', which is a fire-possessor]. This fact, that the mark is ascertained to exist only in what is
like the subject, is the second [of the three characteristics], and is
called 'positive concomitance'.9
Positive concomitance understood in this way does not require that the
mark be present in all members of the relevant class (that smoke be present
in all fire-possessors), as Mok~akaragupta goes on to note. For instance, in
the case of an argument that attempts to use the mark being made by human
action to prove impermanence, the fact that some impermanent things (e.g.,
lightning) are not so produced does not make the argument invalid.
Anvaya still obtains in such a case. Positive concomitance requires only
that the mark not be present in anything not of the relevant class: that no
non-fire-possessors be smoky.
And third, vyatireka, 'negative concomitance'. This means that the mark
is absent in everything that is relevantly unlike S (in this case, all non-firepossessors):
Definite absence of [the mark] is ascertained in what is unlike the
subject. The expression 'what is unlike the subject' means 'a thing different from the subject'; it is the ascertainment of the definite absence
therein that is the third [of the three characteristics], and is called
'negative concomitance' .'0
This is logically equivalent to the statement of positive concomitance. If all
As are B (anvaya), then no non-B is A (vyatireka).
The upshot is that all smoke-possessors are fiery, and that no non-firepossessors are smoky. The claim is not that all fire-possessors are smoky
(this mayor may not be true, but it is not required for positive and negative concomitance). The absence of B (fire) then guarantees the absence of
A (smoke); and the presence of A (smoke) guarantees the presence of fire.
This relation between A and B is otherwise called vyapti, which strictly
means something like 'pervasion', but which I shall translate, following
what is now almost a standard rendering, as 'invariable concomitance'.
Marks that have these three characteristics, and that can as a result be
deployed in arguments of the relevant sort, are in tum of at least two sorts,
says Mok~akaragupta. The first is a mark related to that to which it stands
in a relation of invariable concomitance as effect to cause. The phrase tadutpatti, 'arising from thaI', labels this kind of relation behveen A and B, and
the example given is the one I've been using: smoke is the effect of fire,
which means that it stands in the appropriate causal relation to fire (only
when fire is present is smoke's presence caused). You typically come to
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know that such a causal relation obtains by perception (pratyak?a), but this
does not mean that the relation of tadutpatti is a contingent one. It is, rather,
necessary: all empirical observations will confirm it, and none can falsify it.
But A can also be related to B by identity (tadatmya; this is the second
kind of mark). For instance, when S (this thing in front of me) bears the
property A, 'being a si1!lsapa' (a kind of tree), which is glossed to mean
"bearing distinguishing marks such as branches, leaves, color, and
shape",!' and B is the property 'properly being called a tree', then there is a
relation of identity between A and B: all si1!lsapas are properly called trees,
and where there is the absence of the property 'properly being called a
tree' there is also the absence of the property 'being a si1!lsapa'. Coming to
know that all A-possessors are also B-possessors in this kind of case doesn't require having observed instances of causal connection between A and
B; it requires only knowledge of the proper uses of the term 'tree' (vrk?a).12
There are interesting difficulties here. The properties being a si1!lsapa
and being a tree aren't straightforwardly identical (not even in the sense that
their differences are indiscernible), even though they do stand in a relation
of invariable concomitance of a noncausal type (that is, possessing the
property being a siIpsapa doesn't cause you to possess the property being a
tree). The most likely interpretation of Mok~akaragupta's understanding of
the tadatmya relation is that he is a realist about universals (although certainly not in the same way that some nonbuddhist philosophers, such as
the Naiyayikas, are), which is to say that he thinks universals exist (that the
property being a tree is not just a product of conceptual activity on our part),
and that some of them are related to others by necessary concomitance
(avinabha va) of a noncausal sort. But it is also possible that he is not a realist about universals and thinks of the relations between being a si1!lsapa
and being a tree as entirely conceptual (i.e., you can't coherently think the
former without also thinking the latter). Mok~akaragupta doesn't say
enough to permit a clear decision, and the matter became a topic for debate
for later Buddhist scholasticism, especially in Tibet.
Mok~akaragupta recognizes only these two kinds of relations (causal
relations and identity relations, both of which are necessary), and so only
two patterns of argument relating A to B. In order to provide a good argument that A and B have a relation of invariable concomitance, it must be
shown either that A and B are identical, or that A and B are related causally
by necessary conditionality. If either can be shown, a good argument (one
that is valid and has true premises) has thereby been produced.
Mok~akaragupta is clear that both kinds of relation between A and B (tadatmya and tadutpattl) are relations of necessity, and that such a relation must
be present in an argument in order for demonstration or proof to occur: "It
is improper to arrive at what you want to prove simply by stating a thesis
without logical necessity."'" The emphasis on necessity is evident also in
Mo~akaragupta' s definition of invariable concomitance (vyapb):
Invariable concomitance is defined as the statement of the necessary
presence of B when A is present, and the necessary absence of A
when B is absent. ls
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All arguments thought of by Mok1?akaragupta as good (valid and possessed of true premises) employ and require a strong notion of
sambandha, of logical necessity, and this was one of the main points of difference between Buddhist logicians and some of their Indian counterparts
(especially Naiyayikas). The second element in the arguments (S is an Apossessor, recall) is intended to be uncontroversial and therefore not problematic so far as persuasion is concerned. It includes theses like 'there's
smoke on the mountain', or 'I can't see a pot here', or 'this thing in front of
me has leaves, branches, and a trunk'. And the first element (all A-possessors have B), since it obtains necessarily, is meant to show that one can
demonstrate that, from the uncontroversial states of affairs mentioned,
states of affairs such as 'there's fire on the mountain' or 'there's no pot
here' or 'this thing in front of me is properly called a tree' necessarily follow. It seems at first blush that Mok:;akaragupta thinks of good arguments
as bearing a high degree of persuasive power. Such arguments purport to
show that a particular controversial (dubitable) state of affairs must obtain
if some noncontroversial (indubitable) state of affairs obtains.
But there is of course a further question. If a good argument deploys as
one of its central premises a claim about the invariable concomitance of
two properties, may not disagreement arise about whether in fact such
concomitance obtains? May there not be discussion as to how it is possible
to know that such concomitance obtains? Here is what Mok1?akaragupta
says about that:
It is the common opinion of all philosophers that what offers proof
[S's being an A-possessor] certainly must establish what is to be
proved [S's being a B-possessor] in every case in which a relation of
invariable concomitance between what offers proof and what is to be
proved has itself been proved by a doxastic practice that applies universally.'6

A "doxastic practice that applies universally" (sarvopasaI!1harapramaI)a) is
some method of producing judgment (Mok1?akaragupta, like most
Buddhists, acknowledges only two of these, perception and reasoning or
argument) that applies to (permits the making of true judgments about) all
members of the set about which there is discussion. Either perception or
argument may be used to come to know (to establish, to prove) that a particular instance of invariable concomitance obtains, though perception is
used only to establish causal invariable concomitance (technically, the relation of tadutpattl), while reasoned argument is used to establish invariable
concomitance entailed by identity (technically, the relation of tadatmya).
For example, perception may be used to establish the relation of invariable concomitance between being smoky and being fiery (recall that this relation requires that if you're smoky you're fiery and if you're not fiery
you're not smoky; but not that if you're fiery you're smoky). That this is so
shows clearly that Mok1?akaragupta takes universals (being fierI) and being
smoky are both universals; they can equally well be expressed by abstract
nouns such as fieriness or smokiness, as they often are in Sanskrit) to be perceptible since the relations between them may be established
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perceptually.1? In establishing the invariable concomitance between these
universals perceptually, then, you perceive not only the universals but the
necessary relation between them.l'
In the case of using reasoned argument to establish a required instance of
invariable concomitance, a typical pattern of argument is technically called
"a doxastic practice that rules out the contradictory [of what you want to
show]" (viparyayabadhakapramal)a). Consider the example of invariable
concomitance between the universals momentariness (k?a~likatvam) and existence (sattvam). To show, using the method mentioned, that such concomitance does obtain you must show that the negation of momentariness necessarily rules out existence (this entails that if something exists it is momentary). To put this slightly differently: you must show that denying momentariness to something rules out that thing's existence. Mok$akaragupta's
instance of this kind of argument begins with the claim if S does not possess
causal efficacy successively or nonsuccessively, then S does not possess causal efficacy at all. lY This means that if a putative existent is capable of bringing something about, it must be capable of doing this at some particular time (nonsuccessively), or at a succession of particular times (successively). The next
claim in. the argument is that neither of these two kinds of efficacy belongs
to a nonmomentary thing, from which the conclusion follows that a nonmomentary thing can effect nothing, which is the same as to say that such an
entity does not exist. This final move is permissible given the pan-Buddhist
axiom that existence (sattvam, astitvam) just means the capacity to bring
something about causally (arthakriyakaritvam).2(1
This argument is intended to show that nonmomentariness entails
nonexistence, which is the same as to show that existence entails momentariness. To show this is to apprehend "by a doxastic practice" (argument)
"that rules out the contradictory" (the claim that nonmomentariness is
compatible with existence) the relation of invariable concomitance that is
supposed to obtain between existing and being momentary. And once this
invariable concomitance is known it can be deployed in other argumentsfor example, against the idea of a permanent God.
To this point I've summarized Mok$iikaragupta's understanding of
argument. Because all the arguments he describes use as their central
premise a claim about the invariable concomitance of two universals, they
show (if their premises are true and they are formally valid) their conclusions to be necessary. In this respect the arguments he offers might seem to
be taken by him to bear something like the maximal dialectical force suggested by the quotation from Nozick with which this paper began. This
impression is only reinforced by the fact that, when he explains how to
establish the truth of a claim to universal concomitance, Mok$akaragupta
typically offers an argument to show the incoherence of denying such concomitance. He is not, on the face of it, interested in probabilistic arguments,
or arguments by which an interlocutor might reasonably not be convinced.
But, of course, there is a difference between the claim that an argument (if
it is good) ineluctably demonstrates its conclusions, and the claim that all
who do not recognize it to be good are thereby irrational (or, in the extreme
case, subject to death by brain-implosion) if the goodness of the argument
is denied. The former is a claim about the logical properties of a particular
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type of argument (and Mok;;akaragupta both makes it and should make it
about the kinds of argument he describes). The latter is a claim about the
persuasive power of a particular type of argument (and it is less clear
whether he would or should make it, either about the kinds of argument
he offers, or indeed about any).
To shed some further light on this question of what Mok~akaragupta
thinks about the dialectical (as distinct from the logical) force of argument,
I'll now turn to his anti theistic arguments. These provide a relatively
detailed instance of what looks like dialectical engagement; an examination
of them should permit some tentative suggestions about the central question of this paper: just what was Mok~akaragupta hoping for from the
antitheistic arguments he deployed?

IV Moktjakaragupta on Arguments About Cod (isvara)
Mok~akaragupta offers antitheistic argument at two places in the
TarkabMtja. In the first he offers a rebuttal of a traditional Naiyayika argument that purports to demonstrate the existence of God; in the second he
offers a positive argument of his own whose conclusion is that God cannot
exist. I'll take these in turn.
The theistic Naiyayika argument rebutted by Mok~akaragupta (81-83)
rests upon a classification of existents into three and only three kinds: those
that have definitely been produced by an agent or agents (because such an
agent is seen about his work); those that have definitely not been so produced (the example given here is vyoma, the sky or the atmosphere, which
on the view being discussed here is not an effect: it has no beginning in
time, no set of conditions that brought it into existence); and those about
which it is doubtful whether they've been so produced because no agent
has been seen to produce them (the examples given are ancient trees,
vanaspati, and the earth, k$itl). In its simplest form the Naiyayika argument says: (1) All effects are produced by an intelligent agent (they are
buddhimatkartrka); (2) Existents of the third kind (those about which it's
initially doubtful whether they've been produced by an agent) are effects
(they have the property of karyatva). From which it follows that they must
have been produced by an intelligent agent, and since such an agent cannot be human, it must be divine.
The relation of invariable concomitance that powers this argument is
said to obtain between being an effect and being made by an intelligent agent. If
something has the former property it must have the latter; and (equivalently) if it lacks the latter it lacks the former. According to Nyaya cosmology (I
oversimplify here, but not in such a way as to compromise the discussion
to follow), the only thing that lacks the property being all effect is the
sky / atmosphere; therefore, everything else (humans, animals, trees, the
planet earth, and so on) possesses both the properties in question.
But how is the relation of invariable concomitance between being an
effect and being made by an intelligent agent known? The Naiyayikas say that
it is known by a synthetic mental act (a judgment) based on repeated past
perceptions of such a relation. 21 You've seen lots of clay pots (the favorite
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example of an effect) in the past, and you've observed that they are made
by potters (intelligent agents). You then judge that a causal relation obtains
between being 1111 effect and being made by an intelligent agent of just the same
kind as the one that obtains between being smoky and being fiery.
Mok~akaragupta's response to this argument asks whether the agent
referred to in the property being made by an intelligent agent is supposed to
have a body or not. If the agent is embodied, it will follow that the agent
ought to be visible. But in that case, says Mok~akaragupta, the argument
exhibits the logical fault of the shared mark (the sadhara1)ahetu)-the mark
in this argument, recall, is being an effect. Suppose you're trying to prove
sound is permanent, and you do so by saying all objects of cognition are permanent and sound is an object of cognition. Your mark is then being al1 object of
cognition. If we follow the definitions given earlier (of 'presence in the subject', 'positive concomitance', and 'negative concomitance') it ought to be
the case that this mark does not belong to anything impermanent. If it
does, then there is no relation of invariable concomitance between the
mark and the property whose presence it is supposed to prove (in the case
of the example at hand, being permanent). But in fact the mark in question is
found in all sorts of impermanent things, such as pots. The mark is therefore too widely shared: it cannot do the logical and persuasive work
required of it. The same is true, says Mok~akaragupta, of the mark being an
effect. This is too widely shared because it belongs to things that we know
have no visible (embodied) intelligent agent as their maker. The example
he gives here is that of grass: we see it come into being and yet we don't
see an intelligent agent producing it. If there were such an agent, and the
agent had a body, we would see it. It follows that the theistic argument
fails if it deploys the mark being an effect to demonstrate the presence of the
property being made by an intelligent embodied agent.
But of course God (and fsvara) need not be thought of as embodied, and
perhaps usually are not. So maybe the argument means to use the mark
being an effect to demonstrate the presence of the property being made by an
intelligent disembodied agent. But in this case, says Mok~akaragupta, the
argument exhibits the fallacy called sandigdhavipak~avyavrtti, "doubt
about the exclusion [of the mark] from those things relevantly dissimilar to
the subject." The mark in the theistic argument is being an effect. Given the
(Naiyayika) threefold classification of existents mentioned above, it should
be remembered that some things (e.g., the sky/atmosphere) are thought
not to have been made by an intelligent agent. If the mark is indeed absent
in all members of the class of things relevantly unlike S, things that possess
the property not being made by an intelligent disembodied agent, then it ought
be the case that the mark (being an effect) is absent in, inter alia, the
sky / atmosphere. But it is not clear that this is the case (says
Mok~akaragupta), and since this is so it is also not clear that the required
relation between being an effect and being made by an intelligent disembodied
agent obtains. Perhaps the sky, although not produced by an agent, is
nonetheless an effect or product of agentless causes; it may be that it is not
an effect at all, but this is not known. If this criticism is right, then formal
invalidity applies also to the theistic argument construed as having to do
with a disembodied agent.

516

Faith and Philosophy

The upshot of these criticisms, in Mok~akaragupta's mind, is that the
Naiyayika theistic argument fails formally on the only two possible readings
of itY It does not demonstrate that all effects are made by an intelligent
agent, whether or not that agent is thought of as embodied.23 Further, the failure has to do precisely (and not surprisingly) with doubt about the truth of
the argument's central claim, which is that possessing the property being an
effect entails possessing the property being made by an intelligent agent. As
Mok~akaragupta puts it by way of summary: "The logical relation between
the two, whether one of causal necessity, of identity, or some other such as
essential nature/4 has not been proved by a prior reliable doxastic practice."25
So much for Mok~akaragupta's rebuttal of a positive argument for
Cod's existence. TI1e upshot of the rebuttal is only that no successful argument has been offered for an invariable-concomitance relation that would
establish Cod's existence. Doubt remains as to whether the required relation in fact obtains, and it is a doubt that has to do with a matter of fact (is
the atmosphere an effect or not?) rather than a matter of logic. This, it
seems, is not a strong rebuttal. A Naiyayika debater could well respond
that, as a matter of fact, the atmosphere is not an effect, in which case the
invariable concomitance between not being made by an intelligent agent and
not being an effect remains. And a non-Naiyayika theist (or anyone not committed to the idiosyncrasies of Nyaya cosmology) could provide the
proverbial barren woman's son as an instance of something not made by
an intelligent agent and also not an effect (because not an existent at all).
These strategies are not pursued in the text, however.
Mo~akaragupta's rejection of theism is not limited to showing that positive theistic arguments fail. He also offers a positive argument of his own
whose conclusion is that Cod cannot exist. Consider, he says, the claim that
everything has been made by an intelligent agent. Suppose, then, that such
an agent is permanent (nitya). If this is the case then the agent's capacity to
bring about effects (to act in such a way that the results he desires occur)
would also be permanent, for a capacity of this kind is an essential property
of an agent (or, if you prefer, is part of the definition of an agent). In the case
of a divine agent (an eternal and omnipotent agent) there is nothing at any
time that does or could obstruct or prevent the effects of divine agency from
occurring. But one of the things that divine agency brings about (according
to the view that Mok~akaragupta wants to reject) is creation (sarga) of the
cosmos; another is destruction (pralaya) of the cosmos. 26 It follows, absurdly, that at every time the cosmos is being both created and destroyed, for the
divine agent would always be both creating and destroying it.
This argument proposes a relation of invariable concomitance between
being an eternal and omnipotent agent at t (where t is some particular time)
and actualizing one's agential capacity at t. It moves from this proposed relation by reductio (prasariga, the demonstration of an absurd entailment) to
the conclusion that there cannot be an eternal, omnipotent agent whose
capacities include creation and destruction. And since such an agent would
be Cod (Isvara), it follows that there cannot be Cod.
Mok~akaragupta cites two possible responses to this argument. The first
is that the fact that all of Cod's agential capacities are not actualized at
every time is explicable by the absence at some times (and presence at oth-
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ers) of auxiliary or secondary causes (sahakarin). But this would make secondary causes independent of God, and this conclusion ought to be unacceptable to theists for other reasons.
But suppose, says the theist, that the temporal separation of some of
God's acts from others is to be explained precisely by the fact that He is
intelligent, possessed of volition, and chooses to do one thing at one time
and another at another, even though He could have done all things at all
times?2H Mok$akaragupta's response to this is to say that if such temporallyindexed choices are part of God's nature,29 then it remains inexplicable why
He sometimes has them and sometimes does not; the principle assumed
here is that if some property is essential to you, you cannot have it only
sometimes. And, obviously, if the temporally-indexed choices mentioned
by the opponent are not essential properties of God, then their occurrence at
a particular time must be causally dependent upon things other than God,
and this takes the debate back to the claim (mentioned in the preceding
paragraph) that some secondary causes are indeed independent of God.
The principle underlying the proposed invariable concomitance
between being an omnipotent agent at t and actualizing one's agential capacity
at t is one that Mok$akaragupta attributes to Dharmaklrti: that change is
not predicable of an eternal entity's essential properties. If it were, the
putative eternal entity would precisely not be eternal because it would at
some times lack at least one of its essential properties.3()
This argument raises deep and interesting philosophical questions,
among which are: Is it coherent to say that there are temporally-indexed
properties of the kind is potentially nz? Can it reasonably be said that an
entity free of change possesses such properties? Can an entity free of
change be related causally to temporally-indexed things or events?
Mok$akaragupta's positive argument for God's nonexistence doesn't
demonstrate that a negative answer ought to be given to all these questions. Rather, it assumes such an answer in proposing invariable concomitance between being an omnipotent agent at t and actualizing one's agentia7
capacity at t.

V The Persuasive Power of Argument: Reprise
Mok$akaragupta's antitheistic arguments (and those offered by Indian
Buddhists generally) were not persuasively effective: those to whom they
were offered (Naiyayikas and other Hindu theists) were not convinced by
them to abandon theism. Similarly, the theistic arguments offered by
Naiyayikas and others suffered from dialectical failure: their nontheistic
interlocutors (Buddhists and others) were not persuaded by them to
become theists. Both Buddhists and Naiyayikas were, of course, aware that
their arguments failed dialectically in these ways. Why then did they persist in offering them? What, to return to the question of my title, did they
hope for from them?
The persuasive failures of these arguments do not mean that all (or
indeed any) of them are formally invalid, or lack true premises, or suffer
from some other tedmical fault. Neither does it mean that those on one side
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or the other were too stupid or sinful properly to understand the arguments
they were being offered (though of course stupidity and sin were not less
widely distributed in medieval India than they are in contemporary
America, which means that there must have been many Buddhists and
Naiyayikas afflicted by them to the point of being incapable of understanding or using argument). Rather, the reasons for persuasive failure are deeper,
more interesting, and of more general application, or so I shall now argue.
Recall that Mokf;iakaragupta offers two kinds of antitheistic argument.
The first is negative and responsive: it attempts to show that an opponent's
positive argument for God's existence fails, and tries to do this by using
nothing other than the terms of that opponent's argument. It works, that is,
largely by reductio or prasaliga. The second is positive and attempts to
show in its own terms that God cannot exist. While both kinds of argument
usually fail persuasively, the former does so less often and less drastically
than the latter, and the reasons for failure are somewhat different in each
case. It therefore makes sense to treat them separately.
If you offer an argument of any sort and you're faced with a rejection of
it that shows (or attempts to show) that your argument fails in its own
terms (a prasariga argument in Mok~akaragupta's terms), you may of
course ignore the rejection; but if you do pay attention to it your response
is almost certain to belong to one or another of the following three kinds.
First, you may object that the opponent's understanding and restatement
of your argument is faulty, and that as a result the proposed reductio doesn't work. Second, you may acknowledge that the opponent has understood
your argument well, that the difficulty indicated is genuine, but that the
argument can be readjusted in such a way that it no longer exhibits it.
Third, you may agree that the reductio is a success, judge that the argument cannot be salvaged, and therefore abandon it. The first and second
responses may overlap in various ways: you may wish to say that the
opponent has misunderstood your argument, but your restatement of it
may nonetheless alter it in response to the criticism even if such alteration
is not (for polemical or face-saving reasons) acknowledged.
In the case of Mokf;iakaragupta's prasariga argument summarized
above, responses of these sorts might require from Naiyayikas an assertion
that Mok~akaragupta has misunderstood what they think about the
sky / atmosphere, and that as a result the logical fallacy he indicates does
not hold (a version of the first response); or that the argument can be made
to hold by altering what has heretofore been said about the sky / atmosphere (a version of the second response); or that at least this version of the
argument from being an effect to being made by a rational agent has to be
dropped. There is some evidence in Nyaya thought of responses one and
two (though it's beyond the scope of this essay to survey it), and little or
none of response three (which is scarcely surprising). But notice that not
even the third response requires dropping the view that there is in fact a
relation of invariable concomitance between being an effect and being made
by an intelligent agent; it requires only abandonment of a particular argument deploying that relation.
Prasariga arguments seem likely in principle to have some dialectical
effect (and seem actually to have had some in the history of Indian debate
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about God): they are likely at least to prompt further attention to and finetuning of arguments already in play. They may even occasionally result in
the abandonment of particular arguments. But they are not likely to (and as
a matter of fact do not) result either in the abandonment of the thesis for
which the criticized argument argues (in this case the claim that existents not
seen to have been made by an intelligent agent have in fact been so made), or in the
abandonment of the view that there is a relation of universal concomitance
(in this case between being an effect and being made by an intelligent agent) that
indicates the truth of such a claim. It is therefore in prasarlga arguments that
what limited dialectical effectiveness there is may be found.
The failure to persuade of the second kind of antitheistic argument presented by Mok:;;akaragupta (the positive argument whose conclusion is
that God cannot exist) is deeper and more interesting. Its failure is largely
attributable to the fact that it (and other arguments like it) always and necessarily axiomatically assume and deploy the truth of complex claims in
metaphysics, epistemology, or logic (or all three). Such axiomatic assumptions are, by definition, not explicitly thematized or argued for as part of
the argument; they are, instead, among the implicit requirements for the
argument's validity. Assumptions of this kind may themselves become an
explicit topic of argument, but when they do the arguments about them
will then in tum deploy some (but now different) axiomatic assumptions.
Further, such axiomatic assumptions are almost always not self-evidently
true, which is to say that they may reasonably not be assented to; and yet
assent to them is required in order for the argument to be persuasive. The
absence of such assent, even in the face of an argument's formal validity,
makes the argument fail as a tool of persuasion.
In the case of Mok:;;akaragupta's argument for God's necessary nonexistence, an invariable concomitance between being an eternal and omnipotent
agent at t (where t is some particular time) and actualizing one's agential capacity at t is assumed and proposed. Mok:;;akaragupta acknowledges, as
already shown, that any particular proposed instance of invariable concomitance may itself become a matter for question (for if the proposed relation is not actuat any argument that deploys it will fail), and that when it is
questioned it ought to be shown to obtain by appeal to either perception or
reasoning. But here is the rub. As I've already suggested, any attempt to
show that this particular instance of invariable concomitance obtains will
require appeal to (and argument about) such interesting matters (among
many others) as the status of properties like is potentially m (and of an ontology that goes with asserting or denying the possibility of such properties).
A perceptive theistic respondent to Mok:;;akaragupta's positive antitheistic
argument will rapidly see that in order to be persuasive the argument
requires assent to all sorts of claims that it does not argue for, many of them
deeply controversial and difficult of resolution. It follows rapidly that it will
be easy to maintain rationality (not to mention a brain free of mortal reverberations) while not being persuaded by such an argument.
If there is a general principle here (and if this principle is a good one it
applies to much more than antitheistic arguments propounded by
Buddhists) it is this: the interest and scope of an argument's conclusion is
(and ought to be) inversely proportional to that argument's persuasive
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power. This is why Mok$akaragupta's negative argument as to the failure
of a Naiyayika theistic argument is more dialectically efficacious than his
own positive argument for God's necessary nonexistence. After all, there
are not many theses more interesting or with wider scope than the thesis it
is incoherent to claim that there is an eternal agent (which is, approximately,
the upshot of Mok$akaragupta's positive argument).
It remains to return to the question in this paper's title. Did
Mok$5karagupta (or did Indian Buddhists generally) have the modest
expectations that I've argued they ought to have had for the persuasive
power of their antitheistic arguments? This is not a question that I can yet
answer clearly, though there are certainly indications in favor of a positive
answer. Most Buddhist anti theistic argumentation appears to have been
developed for the purpose of training monks to understand and deploy the
technicalities of their own tradition, to become skilled practitioners of a certain mode of intellectual activity. Mok$akaragupta's Tarkabha~a certainly
has the character of a manual intended for that purpose, as do most of the
other Indian works in which such arguments are developed. And in so far
as that is the central purpose of antitheistic argument in the Indian
Buddhist tradition, persuasive power is hardly relevant at all. But there are
also indications on the other side, indications that at least some Buddhist
scholastics engaged themselves directly and deeply with Naiyayika (and
other nonbuddhist) works, responded to them, and hoped or intended that
their responses should in turn provoke a response (which they sometimes
did: Buddhist critiques were among the influences upon the development
of thought about many things among Naiyayikas, Mimaqlsakas, Jains, and
many others in India). Even these facts, though, do not require the conclusion that Buddhists had a high evaluation of the persuasive power of their
antitheistic arguments. My own preliminary judgment (although much
further empirical work on the uses of argument in Indian scholasticism is
needed) is that antitheistic argument for Indian Buddhists was principally
a tool for elaborating, embroidering, and knitting together the conceptual
fabric of their tradition, and only secondarily (if at all) a device for convincing anyone of anything. This too is largely what theistic argument has been
(and ought still to be) for Christians.
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Buddhist views on the part-whole relation, and on the existence of universals.
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Belknap Press, 1981), p.4.
3. On Mok~akaragupta's life see Kajiyama Yuichi (trans!.), "An
Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the
Tarkabha~a of Mok~akaragupta," Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters [Kyoto
University110 (1966):1-173, at 6-11.
/
/
4. In his introductory remarks to the Sik~asamuccaya Santideva says that
in his work he will say nothing that has pot been said before: na ca kirpcid
apurvam atra vacyam, P. L. Vaidya, ed., Sik~asamuccaya (Darbhanga: Mithila
Institute, 1961), p.3. This is an entirely typical claim, and one made with not the
slightest hint of apology or regret.
5. I've used the Sanskrit text in B. N. Singh, ed., Mok~'lkaraguptavjracjta
Bauddhatarkabhl~a (Varanasi: Asha I'rakashan, 1985). Parenthetical numbers
in the text and notes indicate pages of this work. It also contains a largely
incomprehensible and often inaccurate English translation; Kajiyama's version
is much better.
6. sisunam alpamedhasam dharmaklrtimatasrutyai tarkabha~a prakasyate (15).
7. vyaptipak~adharmatasarpjflakarp dvyavayavam eva sadhanavakyarll
saugatanam (62).
8. anumeye sattvam eva niscitam I anumeye parvatadau dharmiDi
lingasyastitvam eva niscitarp tad ekarp rCtparp pak~adharmatasarpjflakam (60).
9. sapak~a eva sattvarp niscitam iti vartate I samaDary pak~ary sapa~ary I
pa~eDa saha sadrso dr~tantadharmlty artha!) I sapak:;;a eva sattvarp niscitam
ity anvayasarpjflakarp dvitIyarp rupam (60).
10. asapak:;;e casattvam eva niscitam I na sapak:;;o 'sapak:;;ary I tatrasattvam
eva niscitarp vyatirekasarpjflakarp trtIyarp rupam (61).
11. sakhapatravan)asarpsthanavise~;;avyavaharayogyatvat (62).
12. Mok:;;akaragupta also recognizes relations between A and B that have
to do with absence rather than presence. For instance, for those things that
have the property of being visible wherever they happen to be (drsya, upaJabdhipraptaJak~aI)a), there is invariable concomitance between A ('not being
seen here') and B ('not being here'). But this does not suggest a third kind of
relation between A and B so much as an argument as to their causal relation
(tadutpatti) that appeals to absence rather than presence. Mok:;;akaragupta
devotes a good deal of discussion to subkinds of arguments to and from
absence (63-65). But these details, important though they are in the context of
Mok:;;akaragupta's work, need not detain us here.
13. On this see Georges Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's
Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations (Albany, New York: State University of
New York Press, 1997), pp.171-178; Tarkabha~a, 89-90.
14. pratijflavacanamatrat sambandharahitat sadhyapratipatter ayogat (62).
15. sadhanasya ca sadhye niyatatvakathanarp sadhyabhavasya sadhanabhave niyatatvakathana'11 nama vyaptir abhidhlyate (81).
16. sadhana'11 khalu sarvatra sadhyasadhanasyoh sarvopasarpharel)a
pramaDena vyaptau siddhayarp sadhya'11 gamayed iti sarvavadisammatam
(81).
17. On this controversial topic Mok:;;akaragupta explicitly denies that the
bare particular, the svaJak~aI)a, is the only object of perception, and asserts that
the universal, the samanyalak~aI)a, may also be perceived (26). See also his discussion of universals (89-90), and of the kind of invariable concomitance
grasped by perception (91). Useful remarks on this controversial (among
Buddhists and especially among followers of Dharmaklrti) position are to be
found in Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality, pp.316-327.
18. There are difficulties here, of course, not least among which is whether
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a single perception of the causal relation between smoke and fire suffices to
establish the required relation between the universals smokiness and fieriness.
For some discussion see Kajiyama, "Introduction," p.l13, n.305.
19. I follow Kajiyama's reconstruction ("Introduction," p.1l5) of this passage into Sanskrit from the Tibetan version. The passage is lacking in the original Sanskri t.
20. On this topic see Nagatomi Masatoshi, "Arthakriya," Adyar Library
Bulletin 31-32 (1967-68):52-72; Kano Kyo, "On the Background of PV 1I 12abThe Origin of Dharmaklrti's Idea of ArthakriYil," in Ernst Stein kellner, ed.,
Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition (Vienna: Austrian Academy of
Sciences, 1991), pp.1l9-128.
21. karyarp tavat buddhimatai) kumbhakarad upajayamanarp
bhuyodarsanasahayena manasapratyak~el)opalabdham (81).
22. What I've said to this point by no means exhausts Mok~akaragupta's
discussion of the argument. The Tarkabha$a goes on to analyze the Nyaya
view of the logical relation called svabhavikasambandha and its relevance to
the theistic argument (82-83). But to summarize the points made in that discussion would lengthen this paper unduly, and would not significantly alter the
argument.
23. Mok~akaragupta adds (84) that even if the argument did succeed in
demonstrating what it intends to demonstrate, it would not show that the
intelligent agent in question is God (omniscient, eternal, and so forth). This is a
familiar point in western critiques of the cosmological and design arguments
for God's existence.
24. This is a logical relation proposed by Naiyayikas as a tertium quid
between necessary causal relations (tadutpath) and identity relations (tadatmya). It is not accepted in this sense by Buddhists (82). For a very useful discussion of the sense in which svabhavapratibandha is accepted by Buddhists,
see Claus Oetke, "Svabhavapratibandha and the Types of Reasons in
DharmakIrti's Theory of Inference," in Steinkellner, ed., Studies, pp.243-268.
25. anayos tadatmyarp tadutpattir anyo va svabhavikadisambandhai)
purvapramal)ena na prasadhitai) (83).
26. The view that the cosmos undergoes periodic creation and destruction
at God's hands is one held by many Hindu theists.
27. napy anityena sahakaril)a virahito 'nityasahakaril)o 'pi tad ayattajanmatvat (90).
28. buddhimarps tu kartum Isano 'pi anicchan na karoti (90-91).
29. ta apIcchai) svasattamatranibandhal) (91).
30. Mok~akaragupta quotes Dharmaklrti's lapidary formulation: nityasya
nirapek~atvat kramotpattir na yujyate I kriyayam akriyayam ca kalayoi)
sadrsatmanai) (91).

